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Agricultural  Protection:  An Observation  and
Warning
Jimmye  S.  Hillman
Agricultural protection,  especially  of the nontariff type,  is  on the  increase despite
some  recent  appearances  to  the  contrary.  The  forces  behind  this  trend  are  heavily
economic  and immediate,  relating principally  to domestic farm programs.  But there are
other forces:  self-sufficiency  policies,  social  and cultural  factors,  and national  security
matters, which are also used to support protection in the political arena and over the long
run.  It is imperative that the leading industrial countries,  with the assistance  of leading
developing  countries,  negotiate  trade arrangements and agricultural adjustment policies
that take advantage  of the proven  principles of comparative  advantage.  The alternative
might be  a trade breakdown  similar  to that of the  1930s.
The principal purpose of this brief article is
to  draw attention  to,  and to  warn  against,  a
growing protectionist  sentiment in the Unit-
ed  States  and  abroad.  The  world  can  ill  af-
ford another period of trade breakdown  such
as  that  which  existed  in the  1930s.  Though
historical  experience  is drawn  upon,  it is  not
the purpose here  to  chronicle  a detailed  his-
tory of agricultural protection.  McCalla's (pp.
329-343)  excellent  treatment  makes  this  un-
necessary.  Nor  is  it  the  purpose  here  to
analyze the theoretical questions arising from
the gains from trade argument.  This  is care-
fully  done  by  Chambers,  Letiche  and
Schmitz.
The essence of the message,  therefore,  re-
duces  to  a  reminder,  with  caution  and  ap-
propriate  documentation,  that  what  hap-
pened  in  that  turbulent  period  can  happen
again.  Moreover,  there  is  a  new  interpreta-
tion of the crash of 1929 which attributes that
disaster  to  the  "protectionist  binge"  in  the
Western  countries  particularly  that  in  the
United  States  during  the  nineteen  twenties
[Wanniski].
Skepticism  relative to the benefits of freer
trade has spread rapidly during the past dec-
ade.  Mr.  George  Meany,  President  of  the
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AFL-CIO,  epitomized this  skepticism  at the
1978  Annual  Meeting  of  that body  when  he
said  that  "free  trade  is  a  joke  and  a  myth."
Other major labor unions are plugging harder
and harder for import curbs.  So are  manufac-
turers in industries  such as steel and textiles.
So  are  producers of many agricultural  prod-
ucts.
This  attitude  has been  exacerbated  by the
worst  world  recession  in  forty  years.
Moreover,  there  is  great  concern  about  the
security  of  supplies  of  food  and  raw  mate-
rials,  which  aids and abets  protectionist sen-
timent.  Finally,  there  is  a  general  fear  that
the  growth  of  international  trade  may  have
reached  a  point  which  erodes  the  ability  of
many  governments  to  pursue  their  desired
agricultural  goals  and policies.  These  skepti-
cisms  and  fears  resulted  in  a  new  wave  of
protectionist  sentiment  in  the  mid-to-late
1970s,  especially  portrayed  in  the  activity
surrounding  nontariff trade barriers.
The  European  Economic  Community
(EEC)  and Japan  are  in the forefront  of  this
trend  in the  agricultural  sector;  the  United
States  and the EEC  lead protectionistic  sen-
timent  toward  nonagricultural  goods.  Beef
and lamb,  dairy products,  sugar,  citrus and a
variety  of other agricultural  products  as well
as steel,  textiles, ball bearings and television
sets among industrial  products have  all been
subject  to pressures  for higher protection.
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High  prices  and continued  inflation  in re-
cent  years  have  diverted  attention  from  ag-
ricultural  trade  problems  and  have  masked
the  distorting  influences  of  historical  and
protectionist  domestic  agricultural  policies.
Higher world  market prices  during  the mid-
1970s brought about by tight supplies,  made
some  protective  devices  temporarily  un-
necessary  or  made their impact  seem  small.
(In fact,  high prices have emphasized another
important  set  of problems  which  deal  with
security  of supplies and  instability.)  This  "il-
lusory"  respite  from  agricultural  protection
which  the  world  experienced  during  the
rapid  rise  in  prices  appears  to  be  in  direct
contrast to  tendencies  which  have prevailed
in  agricultural  trade  for at least  forty years.
In  recent years  strong attempts  to  restrict
food  and  fiber  exports  have  been  added  to
private  and  public  actions  to  prevent  im-
ports.  The  United  States  embargo  on  soy-
bean  shipments  in  1973  and its  restraint  on
wheat  shipments  in  1974  are  illustrative.
Also,  very  high  export  taxes  on  wheat  and
barley  by the  EEC  during the  "grain  crisis"
of 1972-75 acted as a virtual embargo  on out-
flow of  those products from  Europe.
The  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and
Trade  (GATT)  in  its  1976-77  Annual  Report
stated,
"The  spread  of protectionist  pressures
may  well prove  to  be the  most  important
current  development  in  international
economic  policies,  for  it  has  reached  a
point  at  which  the  continued existence  of
an international order based on agreed and
observed  rules  may be said  to be  open to
question.  It is not  difficult  to  identify the
sources  of the pressures  for increased  pro-
tection.  ... between  1973 and 1976 indust-
rial  production  in  developed  areas  effec-
tively  stagnated,  while  in  the  developing
countries  industrial  capacity,  production
and  exports  continued  to  grow;  and  in  a
stagnating  market,  import-absorption  gen-
erates  additional  friction  and  demands  for
protection.  A  willingness  on the  part of so
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many  governments  to  give  effect  to these
demands  is  more  difficult  to  understand,
however,  since  in  so doing  they  have be-
come  involved  in  contradictions  between
their  stated  policy  objectives  and  actual
policy  conduct."  (GATT).
The  same  GATT  report  assails  "Orderly
Marketing"  arrangements  which  involve  a
popular  new  restrictive  device  between  na-
tions  under  which  low-cost  exporters  "vol-
untarily"  restrict exports  to countries  where
their  goods  are  damaging  an  industry.  The
International  Herald  Tribune  had  a  special
series  of  articles  entitled  "The  Gathering
Forces  of Protection"  in  a recent  issue  (Oc-
tober  1977,  p.  9).
Trade  negotiations  have  been  underway
since 1975 in the Tokyo Round of the GATT at
Geneva in  an attempt to  modify overt as well
as  subtle new acts of protection.  Without de-
tailing the reasons  for this new phenomenon
of protection,  it  is  constructive  to briefly  re-
view the development  of agricultural  protec-
tion.  Moreover,  there may be a very practical
reason for  such a review and an added warn-
ing: should agricultural  production and sup-
ply  in the  industrialized countries return to
surplus conditions characteristic  of the 1950s
and 1960s it  is  almost inevitable that trade
barriers and  distortions will  again become
more  important.  Barriers  and  distortions
have not disappeared in the 1970s.  Most con-
tinue,  have  gone  "underground,"  or  have
been  temporarily  inoperative,  e.g.,  Com-
modity Credit  Corporation  disposal  activity,
or inactivity.
A  Theoretical Note
Classical  and neoclassical  economists  have
long  emphasized  that  nations  gain  from  in-
ternational trade.  Despite  this,  many sectors
of national economies,  including agriculture,
appear  to be more  protectionist.  Arguments
supporting  free  trade  and  a  survey  of  the
major  theoretical  issues  in  the  gains  from
trade  question  have  been  reviewed  recently
by  Chambers,  Letiche  and  Schmitz.  One of
their  conclusions  is  that  most  empirical
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studies  demonstrate that there are gains from
allowing nations  to trade.
If  the  standard  theory and  empirical  evi-
dence  are  valid,  those countries  with a  high
degree  of protection,  say, to their agricultural
sector,  must be acting, at least in part, on the
basis  of  noneconomic  criteria.  There  is  the
possibility,  of  course,  that  the  principal
theory  and the  empirical  evidence  have  not
adequately  depicted  reality  and  thus  have
overemphasized  the  proposition  that  there
are  positive  gains  from  trade.  For  example,
contrary  evidence  to  standard  is  developed
by  Emmanuel  in  the  theory  of unequal  ex-
change.  It  must  be  remembered,  too,  that
List's  arguments  for  protection  are  a funda-
mental part of the  standard theory.
The principal  theme  of  the  normative  as-
pects  of  modern  trade  theory  supports  the
claim  of classical  economists  that,  with  ap-
propriate  compensation,  trade  results  in  an
improvement  of economic  welfare.  Leontief,
in  a  classic  paper,  demonstrated  how  stan-
dard consumer  theory can be used to analyze
international  trade.  A more rigorous  proof of
the  existence  of either  actual  or  potential
gains  from  trade  was  shown  by  Samuelson
(1962).  Many other theoretical examples rela-
tive to the gains from trade questions are con-
tained in the Chambers,  Letiche and Schmitz
article cited  above.
The  outcome  of protection  is  not  always
negative.  A country can gain from protection,
particularly  in  the  short  run;  and  provided
there is  no retaliation.  Many authors,  among
them Baldwin (pp.  91-101),  have constructed
theoretical  frameworks  demonstrating  that
tariffs  and  quotas  can  lead  to  greater  gains
from free trade providing there is no retalia-
tion.  In  a world  of good  communication  the
non-retaliation assumption  is quite heroic.  A
more  realistic hypothesis  is that the possible
long  run  outcome  of increased  protection  is
decreased  welfare.
A  much  broader  objective  of protectionist
policy  is  the  so-called  "scientific  tariff."
Johnson  points  out  that  there  are  a  large
number  of commonly  recognized  arguments
for protection  and he constructs  a "scientific
tariff'  for  each  of  the  following  objectives:
1) to  promote  a  "way  of  life,"  national  self-
sufficiency  and independence;  2)  to increase
military preparedness;  and 3) to strengthen  a
country's  international  bargaining position.
Other  factors  to  be  considered  in  argu-
ments  for  or  against  protection  involve
technological  and  economic  concentration,
social  and  economic  adjustment  processes,
and the amount  of money necessary to  com-
pensate losers in any process of trade liberali-
zation.  The important theoretical  issue to be
surfaced  here,  however,  is the potential los-
ses  in  world  welfare  which  might  derive
from an  increasing amount  of protection and
in an ultimate major breakdown in  trade.
Protection Embedded in History
The  history  of agricultural  protection  is a
chronicle  of response, or lack thereof,  on the
part of central governments  to the clamor by
farmers  for help against economic forces from
outside  which  disturb  their  prices  and  in-
comes  as  well  as  their  farm  structures  and
way  of life.  Many of the present  problems  of
agriculture  all  over  the  world,  but  particu-
larly in western industrialized countries,  may
be  largely  attributable  to  past  failures  of
farmers  to  adapt  in  response  to  changing
economic  conditions  and  political  cir-
cumstances;  but they also  reflect a failure  on
the  part  of  governments  to  realize  that
neither  extreme  laissez-faire  nor  total  inter-
ventionist  methods will  produce  an  accepta-
ble  solution to problems  of commercial farm-
ing and the rural sector of nations in the late
twentieth  century.  An  "optimal"  degree  of
intervention  for  individual  countries  and  for
the  world  is  a  topic  most  difficult  to  assess.
Current  policy  positions  of  countries  in  in-
ternational  bodies  such  as  the  EEC,  the
GATT  and  United  Nations  Conference  on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reflect a
century  or  more  of decisions  in  national  as-
semblies  regarding agriculture  and rural life.
It  will  take time  and  constant  bargaining  to
arrive  at  types  of programs  which  could  be
judged as contributing to acceptable, feasible
and helpful freer trade  objectives.
Until World War I the protective tariff was
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the major instrument used to shield domestic
agriculture  from  outside  competition.  Great
Britain  because  of  historical  forces,  the  In-
dustrial Revolution,  a shift in the power away
from  the  rural  sector,  and  national  political
reasoning,  decided on  a free trade policy and
held rigidly to that position until 1931.  Little
positive  action  was  taken  to  aid the  farmer,
either  directly or  indirectly.  The adaptation
which  the farmer  was  forced to  make was  in-
strumental  in sustaining industrial  expansion
but  long term  hardship  took  its  toll.  Wheat
production  was  depressed  and  there  was  a
shift  towards  livestock.  Production  per
worker  increased,  the  size  of  holdings  be-
came  larger  and  the  use  of  machinery  ex-
panded.  Thus,  as  Britain's agriculture  finally
entered the European Community in 1978 its
structure  was in a strong position to compete
without  unduly large protection.
Denmark  and the  Netherlands  followed  a
pattern  of free trade  with Britain  during the
nineteenth  century but when  cheap  agricul-
tural imports from  the New World put pres-
sure  on  prices  and  incomes  these  countries
took  positive  action  in order to help farmers
adapt  to the competition.  For  example,  pro-
duction and marketing assistance  were facili-
tated  through  cooperative  structures  and
among  other aids  farmers  made  use of train-
ing institutes  set  up  by  their  governments.
Such  actions  were  eminently  successful  in
that these  countries  were  able  to build  mar-
kets for livestock products  in England  and on
the  Continent,  their farmers  prospered,  and
the agricultural  sector,  instead of stagnating,
made  a  significant  contribution  to  national
economic  growth.
Most  other  countries  in  Europe  have  fol-
lowed a course of high protection for agricul-
ture and  a  conservative  course  regarding  ag-
ricultural  adjustment  since  about  1850.
While  Britain  was adopting  a  free  trade  pol-
icy  in  the  middle  and  late  nineteenth  cen-
tury,  France,  Germany and Italy raised their
tariffs  in  response  to  cheap  products  from
abroad. The result was not only an expansion
of high-cost,  extensive  agriculture,  but  also
an added attraction of resources to the domes-
tic economies of the countries which further
violated  the principle of comparative  advan-
tage.  Resources,  especially manpower, which
could  have moved into other activities,  were
retained in agriculture by rates of duty which
were increased progressively until the period
surrounding  the  outbreak  of  World  War  I.
High  tariffs  on  grains  may  have  even  been
detrimental  to  the  livestock-producing  sec-
tor.  Industrial  expansion  in  countries  like
Germany  was  impeded  because  they  were
hampered  in  concluding  commercial  ar-
rangements  with  other  countries  because  of
high  duties.  Even  so,  unlike  France,  Ger-
many  achieved  great  industrial  status  by
World  War  I.  Consumers  were  penalized
with  produce that would  have  been cheaper
with less protection. And,  not least, high and
inflexible  tariff policies  took  pressure  off
domestic agriculture for adjustment to chang-
ing  conditions  in  trade  and  development.
Hence,  little  attention  was  given  in  these
countries  to  positive  adjustment  assistance
which  would  have  enabled  farmers  to meet
the rigors of competition which  lay ahead.
In  making these observations  about  Euro-
pean agriculture and trade,  one must be cog-
nizant that the  "sacrifice"  of agriculture's  in-
terests was achieved  only  when the  strength
of the urban lobby was great enough to over-
come  the  landowners.  Countries  other  than
Britain  viewed such  action  as  economic  and
political  disaster.  That  is,  only  when  their
own  industrial  base  had  been  built up  to  a
reasonable level could they afford to relax re-
strictions.  It  has  been  noted  that  Portugal,
the centerpiece  of Ricardo's  gains from trade
example,  seems not  to  have fared  so well  in
free trade with a commercially dominant  Bri-
tain  [Sideri].
In the United States the tariff was used as a
revenue  measure  until  1890.  The  McKinley
Tariff act  provided  for the  first  time  a com-
plete schedule of duties on agricultural prod-
ucts.  Prices  were  affected very  little by  this
and  succeeding  upward  adjustments  in  ag-
ricultural  duties, which  culminated  with the
infamous  Hawley-Smoot  tariff act  of  1930.
These acts and a general policy  of protection
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for  an  agriculture  which  had  a  strong  com-
parative  advantage  were politically oriented.
But a high  tariff policy  was  redundant and is
difficult  to  rationalize  for  United  States  ag-
riculture  during  that  period  because  of  its
strong  competitive  position.  That  policy,
also,  had  little  value  to  the  United  States
farmer  in  solving  fundamental  price  and  in-
come  problems.
Modern Agricultural Protectionism
With  the  breakdown  of  the  international
trade mechanism  which followed  World War
I,  a  crisis  enveloped  agriculture  which
ushered  in  new  forms  of  protection
everywhere.  Fundamental  economic  dis-
equilibrium  prevailed  in  the  countryside,
and  nation  after  nation  not  only  insulated
themselves  from  outside  competition,  they
invented  new  measures  to  protect  this  ag-
ricultural sector,  using all types of reasons for
doing  so:  economics,  culture  and  even  na-
tional patriotism.  As restriction was added to
restriction  international  markets  were  stran-
gled  and  the  depression  was  prolonged  by
retaliatory  trade  measures  and  beggar-my-
neighbor  exchange  rate techniques.  Despite
general  depression,  behind these high  walls
of protection agricultural production in many
countries  actually  expanded  and  countries
exacerbated the international problem by try-
ing to solve  their domestic  difficulties  at the
expense  of others.
Therefore,  in light of circumstances the na-
ture of protection changed  from a simple ap-
proach  of  protecting  farmers  exclusively
through  the  import  mechanism  - the  cus-
toms  tariff  - to  more  complicated  and
specific  forms  of protection for particular  ag-
ricultural commodities  which were associated
with  large  interest groups.  Beginning  in  the
late  1920s  and  accelerating  through  the  de-
pressed  1930s most national measures for the
protection  of agriculture took one or  more of
the  following  forms:  1) measures  which  di-
rectly  discouraged  imports;  2)  measures
which  directly  encouraged  exports,  3)  mea-
sures  specifically  designed  to  affect  home
production  and marketing,  and 4)  state trad-
ing which protected agriculture  by distorting
trade through  discriminatory pricing and ex-
change  arrangements.
Direct  intervention  into the  trade  process
began  in the  late  1920s  when  certain  Euro-
pean  governments  began  specifying  mixing
or  utilization  ratios  to  be  used  between
foreign  and domestic  grains  for  milling  pur-
poses.  This  was  followed  by  import  quotas
and  a  variety  of  other  measures  which  di-
rectly  intervened  in  the  importation  of
foreign produce.  France  led the way  in these
new  forms  of  protection.  State  trading  or-
ganizations  were set up in  many countries  to
discriminate in  favor of domestic farmers and
to  offer  unfavorable  terms  to  foreign
suppliers.  Exchange  manipulation  through
licensing and through the use of multiple  ex-
change  rate  processes  was  a  widely  used
technique  in the 1930s and immediately after
World War  II.
In  recent  years  "voluntary"  agreements,
usually  negotiated  at  the  highest  executive
level  between  importing  governments  and
foreign  exporters,  have  become  a  principal
means,  especially in the United States,  of ad-
justing foreign  supplies to the domestic mar-
ket.  It  should  also  be emphasized  that such
agreements  have been undertaken to guaran-
tee  adequate  and  stable  flows  of imports  to
deficit  markets  at  reasonable  prices.  In this
respect,  historically,  one  of  the  fears  in
Western  Europe  is  that  the  flows  of  cheap
food and feed grains from abroad would place
it in  an economic  crisis.  Also,  as  food  deficit
areas,  they  are  more  sensitive  to  instability.
So  is  Japan.  Hence,  these  countries have  al-
ways  been  more  interested  in international
commodity  agreements and other  stabilizing
arrangements  than,  say,  has  the  United
States.
Any such  measures to limit the flow of im-
ports from  abroad are  in themselves  likely to
raise  prices  of  farm  products  to  domestic
producers and consumers,  but many of them
are enacted as counterparts of other price and
income  programs  which  are  specifically  de-
signed to increase welfare  directly at the pro-
ducer's  level. Section  22 of the United States
Agricultural Adjustment Act and the Variable
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Levy  of the European  Common Agricultural
Policy  are  examples  of  direct  trade  restric-
tions  which are  also essential  counterparts  of
domestic farm  legislation.
Payment  of direct subsidies to exporters of
farm  products  is  another  form  of protection
which  grew  in  use  after  World  War  I.  Sub-
sidies  on  exports  have  also  been  ac-
complished  through  multiple  exchange  rates
systems which give favorable rates to export-
ers of particular products;  through an exten-
sion of credit to exporters  on favorable  terms,
through  special  tax  refunds  with  respect  to
exports;  and through  state-trading  processes
which  sell  products  abroad  at  lower  prices
than in the domestic market.  In practice,  the
export  subsidy as  a form  of agricultural  pro-
tection,  like  import  restrictions,  is  in  many
cases  part of more  elaborate  farm  price  and
income  programs.  Foreign  surplus  disposal
programs,  export  restitutions  and  multiple
exchange  discrimination  have  affected  bil-
lions of dollars annually in agricultural  trade.
As  we  have  seen,  countries  began  to  en-
courage  home  production  inadvertently
through  the  use  of  high  protective  tariffs
prior to World War I, but direct intervention
in  the  domestic  production  and  marketing
processes  began  on  large  scale  during  the
1930s.  Today  such protection  through inter-
vention is  an integral  part  of farm  programs
in  many  countries,  industrial  as  well  as  de-
veloping.  Direct income supplements  or "de-
ficiency  payments"  have  often been  used  to
maintain  or  raise  incomes  of  farm  produc-
ers.  Such  intervention  has  generally  been
undertaken  in  order  to  increase  self-
sufficiency ratios  in food production  or to im-
prove  the balance  of payments.  The  United
States,  as opposed to most countries,  inaugu-
rated  strict production  control  operations  in
order  to  make  effective  certain  price  objec-
tives. Yet, even these price support programs
which  attempt  to  raise  and  maintain  prices
for  domestic  producers  above  prevailing
world market  levels  have  been  the chief in-
strument  by  which  farm  programs  are  im-
plemented.
Subsidies  for  adjustment  or  to  adopt  new
practices,  central  or  local  tax  rebates,  and
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subsidization  of  inputs  like  seed,  fertilizer,
credit,  and so  on,  have  all  been  used to in-
crease  farm  incomes.  France,  in  particular,
has used subsidies  to aid the agricultural  sec-
tor in a manner which does not directly affect
prices  and  marketing.  Grants  for  land  im-
provement,  equipment  of rural  public  ser-
vices,  marketing  and  processing  of  agricul-
tural products fall in this category.  Switzerland
has  special assistance  programs  for mountain
areas.  Norway has supported joint machinery
purchases  by  grants  covering  30  percent  of
purchase  value  and  by  cheap  loans  for  the
remainder  of  the  cost  of establishing  of
machinery  stations.  These  are  but examples
of a vast array of subsidies by many countries
to their agricultural  sectors  which  do not ap-
pear  in  the  form  of  direct  border  taxes  or
overt  protective  measures.
In  most cases there are valid social as well
as economic  reasons  for state intervention  in
the  agricultural  production  and  marketing
processes.  It  is  important,  however,  to  em-
phasize  the protective  elements  of  those  di-
rect and indirect subsidies to local producers.
Such subsidies  assure  higher net incomes.
State trading arrangements  deserve special
attention due to their increased role  in world
agricultural  trade.  As  has  already  been
pointed out, the use by the state  of interven-
tion  measures  might  result  from  deliberate
protectionistic  motivation;  but  a  special  ele-
ment of protection can enter through particu-
lar state dealings.  By means  of discriminatory
commercial  bargains  with particular  import-
ing  countries,  certain  exporting  countries
have,  on  occasion,  persuaded  those  import-
ing countries  to  pay  a better price  for prod-
ucts  than  can  be  obtained  by other  export-
ing countries.  When such bargains  are struck
the  contracting  exporters  are  protecting
themselves  against  other  exporters  in  the
market  of the  importing country with whom
they  have  contracted.  Typifying  the  pos-
sibilities under this method of dealing are the
Canadian  Wheat  Board,  New  Zealand  Meat
Producers  Board  and  other  such  arrange-
ments  where  single  sellers  deal  with  single
buyers in foreign  markets.  Completely  state
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owned and operated trading institutions such
as  those  in the  USSR make  it even  easier to
discriminate.
Trends  Since  World War II:
Nontariff Trade Barriers
After World War II,  programs which  origi-
nated  during  the  critical  days  of  the  1930s
were  extended  in  many  countries,  first  in
order  to  expand  output  and save foreign  ex-
change,  and  later  to  stabilize  and/or  to  in-
crease  farm  incomes.  Output  has  been  ex-
panded by programs  which have kept domes-
tic  producer  prices  in  many cases  above the
average prices for equivalent commodities  on
the world market. The common and essential
purpose  of governmental  intervention  in ag-
ricultural  trade has been to protect domestic
producers  against  competition  from  imports
which,  in  turn,  supports  levels  of employ-
ment,  resource use, and incomes  to a degree
higher  than  would  prevail  without  such  in-
tervention.
Some  specific  examples  of  this  interven-
tionist  trend  for  1977  were:  1)  abnormally
high  levies  by  the  EEC  on  wheat,  butter,
cheddar  cheese,  frozen boneless beef,  chick-
en  and  bacon;  2)  French  rejection  and/or
quotas  of British and Irish lamb,  even within
the  EEC;  3)  a  total  British  embargo  of
potatoes late in the year; 4)  a continued  recal-
citrant attitude of Japan toward United  States
beef,  citrus juice and  oranges on  which strict
quotas  and  other  nontariff barriers  (NTB's)
remain;  5)  imposition  of  increased  import
fees  on  sugar,  sirups  and  molasses  in  the
United  States by the President; and 6)  signa-
ture of new "voluntary restraint" agreements
between Australia and the United States with
respect to meat imports in the latter.
These  are  but  examples  of  protectionist
tendencies.  More  ominous  is  the buildup  of
certain  agricultural  supplies  - for  example,
grains in the  United States,  dairy products  in
Europe  and  the  United  States-  which
could revert  to  the export  subsidy  "wars"  of
the  1950s  and  1960s.  Domestic  agricultural
policies  of most  every country are now point-
ing toward  increased  self-sufficiency,  a prin-
cipal result of their foreign exchange  difficul-
ties,  precipitated  by the energy  crisis follow-
ing  1973.  "Self  sufficiency"  goes  hand  in
hand with  protection.
Outside  the agricultural  sector the gather-
ing forces of protectionism are even stronger.
A  continued  and  currently  reinforced  long-
term  Arrangement  on  Cotton  Textiles  is  in-
structive.  This  1962  Arrangement  was  the
first  important  instance  in  which  the  gener-
ally  and  solemnly  agreed  rules  of  post-war
policy  conduct  - includng  the  keystone  of
the  system,  the  nondiscrimination  rule  -
were  formally  set  aside  for  reasons  recog-
nized  as  "pragmatic."  A  program,  including
negotiated import quotas and a  series of siza-
ble tax breaks,  to help the United  States steel
industry  has  been  introduced  in  Congress.
The  EEC,  once  a  staunch  crusader  for  free
trade  and competition  in the  nonagricultural
sector  with  six  million workers  unemployed
in  1978,  has  quietly shifted  to  protectionism
and  cartels  to  combat  this  problem.  Japan
agreed under pressure and with considerable
reluctance  to limit exports  of color television
sets to the United  States.
These  are  some principal  examples.  High
officials  in the GATT  negotiating  teams  con-
tinue  to be worried  that major  governments
have  labored  so  much  and  yet  have  ac-
complished  so little.  The answer seems  to be
that  all  governments  have  been  caught  be-
tween  conflicting  pressures,  with  some
domestic  groups  favoring  negotiations  and
liberalization,  while  others  are  urging  a  de-
fensive,  hold-the-line,  or even retreat policy.
Most of the protective devices which  have
evolved out of attempts to protect a country's
domestic agriculture  against foreign competi-
tion  have  come  to  bear  the  generic  title  of
nontariff  trade  barriers.  Out  of  the  vast
summaries  of  restrictions  prepared  by  the
GATT and the  Foreign  Agricultural  Service
(FAS)  of the  U.S.  Department  of  Agricul-
ture,  one  is able  to derive  generalized  sub-
summaries of nontariff restrictions to interna-
tional trade  in agricultural  products.
The  basic  inventory  performed  by  the
GATT after the Kennedy  Round consisted  of
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TABLE  1.  Agricultural  Commodities:  Nontariff  Barriers  to  Imports  into  Major  Industrial
Countries,  1971
Commodities  European  Economic  UNITED  UNITED
Community  JAPAN  KINGDOM  STATES
Food,  beverages and  A  B  A  B  A  B  A  B
tobacco
Wheat  CMA  Se  QM  S  - Sd  Q  Se
Rice  CMA  Se  QM  S  - - - Se
Barley  CMA  Se  QM  S  - Sd  - Se
Maize  CMA  Se  - - - - - Se
Sugar  CMA  Se  - S  Q  S  Q  S
Beef and  veal  CMA  Se  Q  - - Sd  Qa
Pigmeat  CMA  Se  M  S  q  Sd  - -
Mutton  and lamb  qbmb  Sd  Qa
Poultry  CMA  Se  --  -
Eggs  CMA  Se  - O  - Sd  - -
Butter/Milk  CMA  Se  QM  Sd  Q  S  Q  Se
Fish  CMA  - q  - - S  - -
Citrus  fruit  CMA  Se  q  - q  - - -
Bananas  Qb  Q
Wine  CMA  S
Tobacco  CMA  mb  Se  M  S  - - - Se
Oilseeds, oils and fats
Soybeans and  oil  - - - Sd  - - - Se
Groundnuts  and oil  - - - - - - q  Se
Cottonseed and oil  - - - - - - - S
Rapeseed  and oil  CMA  S  - Sd
Linseed and oil  CMA  S  - - - - - S
Sunflower seed and oil  CMA  S  - -
Olive  oil  CMA  Sd  - -
Castor seed  and oil  - - - - - - - S
Fish meal  - - q
Agricultural  raw
materials
Cotton  - - - - - - Q  Se
Wool  - - - - - S  - Sd
Jute and  bagging  qb  - q
SOURCES:  UNCTAD,  Commodity  Problems  and  Policies,  Access  to  Markets,  a  Report  by  the  UNCTAD
Secretariat. TD/1 15 Santiago, Chile, January 22, 1972, Table A; EEC  Commission, Fourth  General Report on
the  Activities  of  the  Communities,  1970,  Brussels,  February  1971;  Great  Britain,  Ministry  of  Agriculture,
Fisheries  and  Food, Annual Review and  Determination  of  Guarantees  1971  (Cmnd.  4623),  London:  H. M.
Stationery Office, March  1971; United  States,  Office of the President,  Commission on International Trade and
Investment  Policy,  United  States International  Economic  Policy  in  an  Interdependent  World,  (Washington,
D.C.:  U.S.  Government  Office,  July  1971);  GATT  Documents  prepared  in connection with  the  work  of the
Agriculture  Committee  and the Committee  on Trade  and Development.
aContingency quotas on beef and veal and mutton, authorized by legislation,  (not so far applied)  accompanied
by  restraints by supplying countries.
bCertain  member  states only.
over  800  items  [Patterson],  agricultural  and  duction  and  supply,  often  have  a  powerful
nonagricultural.  In the agricultural field,  the  effect  on  possibilities  of  market  access  by
GATT  classification  process  was not  limited  foreign distributors.
to measures  taken  at  national  borders  since  Illustrative  of nontariff trade barrier prob-
many programs,  most of which relate to pro-  lems  is  shown  in the  classification  which  is
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constructed  in Table 1 for  the  EEC,  Japan,
the  United  Kingdom  and the  United  States.
Column A  of the table shows  the general na-
ture of the  restraint  at  the  frontier,  a small
letter indicating  that the measure  is  applica-
ble to  only part of the item  in question:  M,m
indicates  state  trading  or  trading  by  an  au-
thorized  monopoly;  Q,q indicates  quota  re-
strictions;  CMA indicates  a commodity falling
under Common  Market  arrangements.
Column B of the table indicates the general
nature  of  explicit  official  intervention  on
domestic markets,  not including direct or in-
direct subsidies  of inputs of the primary sec-
tor of fiscal privileges  accorded to that sector:
O  indicates  organization  of  the  domestic
market  without official  price  fixation;  S indi-
cates price  supported  or production  subsidy
paid;  Sd  indicates  price  guaranteed  by defi-
ciency payment;  Se indicates  support accom-
panied by provision for  export subsidy.
Frequently  intervention  has  admirable
welfare  and  social  objectives  such  as  that of
reducing the gap between  incomes in the ag-
ricultural  sector  and those  in the  rest  of the
economy;  or that of maintaining  balance be-
tween  economic  sectors,  and  between  and
within  geographic  regions.  But in the indus-
trial countries,  farm  legislation  and adminis-
trative  devices  necessary  for its  effective  op-
eration  have evolved  in such  a way that they
now provide  a considerable  degree  of effec-
tive protection  to domestic producers.  This is
so  much  the  case  that  nominal  protection
provided by traditional  tariffs on  raw agricul-
tural products  is no longer the principal pro-
tective  device  that  existed  during  the
nineteenth  and early  twentieth centuries.
As part of governmental intervention in in-
ternational  marketing,  there  have  arisen
trade  impediments  from  certain  measures
which  have been  outside purely  commercial
policy  objectives.  Such  impediments  arise,
for example,  from health  regulations  govern-
ing  imports,  grading  and  standardization
practices,  technical  specifications  and  ad-
ministrative  rules  interpreting  these  actions
for their enforcement.
Illustrative  of  these  measures  are  Ger-
many's  health  restrictions  relative  to  use  of
certain gases by United  States citrus produc-
ers  to color fruit; Japan's  disallowance of sor-
bate on  imported dried prunes,  although it is
accepted  on  many  domestically  produced
foods;  and Belgium's  insistence  that imports
of beef in  cuts  must weigh  at  least  10  kilo-
grams  each,  whether  boned  or  deboned.
There are hundreds, if not thousands,  of such
health  and sanitary,  administrative,  and reg-
ulatory actions  taken  by governments.
The  remedy  for  many  of  these  impedi-
ments would  appear  to be harmonization  of
legislation  and  administration,  but  it should
be  remembered  that  such  impediments  can
be  used  to harass  trade,  and,  to the  extent
that their impact on  marketing  is  more than
inadvertent,  their  effects  must  be  classified
as protective.
Conclusion
In conclusion,  it might be stated generally
that we have  witnessed and are witnessing  a
deliberate  lag  in  trade  liberalization  in  the
farm  sector  of the major  industrial  countries
and little has been done in the past few years
toward  negotiating  downward  some  of  the
major  barriers  to  international  trade  in  ag-
ricultural  products.
Agricultural  production  industries,  along
with a few others such as the textile industry,
are likely  to be the last and most  difficult  in
which to make progress toward trade liberali-
zation.  There  are  economic  reasons  for  this,
mainly those involving employment and asset
values,  but the cultural  and social arguments
which  call  for  protection  are  still  strong  in
many  governmental  assemblies.  Moreover,
agriculture  is the last major industry which  is
dominated  by  small  firms  and  in  which
economic  instability  and  low  returns  have
justified government  intervention in order to
facilitate an equitable economic and social ad-
justment  process.
Adjustment programs  and trade regulation
have  had  the  objectives  of  not  only  to
stabilize  prices  and income,  but also to  raise
incomes  and to  distribute  them  more  effec-
tively.  In  some instances  they  have worked;
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in  others,  neither  low income producers  nor
consumers  have  benefited  greatly.  The  case
can  be  made  that  agriculture  and  raw
material-producing  industries,  whether  they
be  in  industrialized  or developing  countries,
currently face a potential squeeze resembling
that  of  the  classic  British  model  in  the
nineteenth  century  where  farmers  suffered
greatly from a free trade policy which was not
subsequently  accompanied  by  a  program  of
adjustment  assistance.  Forced  adjustment
which  is  too  rapid,  and  without  objectives
which  include  equity  for  human  resources,
can  do long-range  harm  to  the  farm  sector.
Research  is needed  on  that important  ques-
tion.
The time is  propitious  for the world's lead-
ing  industrialized  countries  through  the
GATT,  with the assistance  of the developing
countries  through  UNCTAD,  to  negotiate
trade  arrangements  and  agricultural  adjust-
ment  policies  which  will  take  advantage  of
the proven  principles  of comparative  advan-
tage.  Such  arrangements  and  adjustments
would  benefit  consumers  and  taxpayers
throughout the world.
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